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Democracy, toleration, and the interests of the people 
For most of its long history, the term ‘democracy’ has been regarded with hostility. Part of 
the fascination of the English Revolution has been the unusual spectacle, in a pre-modern 
culture, of writers who were happy to appropriate the label. They understood ‘the people’ not 
only as the source from which all licit power must flow (a point on which there was in fact 
surprisingly widespread agreement) but as a political actor that had and ought to have a 
permanent and independent role in politics. The emergence of such thinkers is a surprising 
fact. It becomes yet more surprising when it is realised that those who were willing to think 
about ‘the people’ in this way were members of a relatively small minority even within the 
party that supported parliament. Whatever their other beliefs, they favoured ‘liberty of 
conscience’, that is to say, freedom of worship for those deemed conscience-driven. 
In consequence, their major political problem was not so much the obvious one that Lady 
Fairfax shouted at King Charles’s prosecutor – that ‘not half, not a quarter of the people of 
England’1 supported the procedures that led to regicide – as the fact that prospective 
arrangements involving majority rule were virtually certain to encourage persecution 
affecting significant numbers of English puritans. The problem, moreover, had little to do 
with former royalists. The parliamentarian mainstream was ‘presbyterian’ – in other words, it 
favoured a uniform national church whose norms would be defended by some measure of 
coercion. As Edmund Whalley told the officers’ Council at the so-called Whitehall debate a 
week after Pride’s Purge, there was an incoherence in Leveller attempts to insert or imply a 
liberty in spiritual affairs as part of their Agreement of the People ‘how can we term that to be 
an Agreement of the people which is neither an agreement of the major part of the people, 
and truly for anything I can perceive… not the major part of the honest party of the 
kingdom?’2 
The history of the next ten years reveals that this perception was widely shared and 
probably well founded. The central political crisis of the English Commonwealth – the 
Army’s intervention in 1653 to put an end to the Rump Parliament – was shaped by a fear of 
the outcome of an unfettered vote even within a radically purged electorate.  In the speech in 
which he welcomed the Rump Parliament’s successor (the unelected body since generally 
referred to as Barebone’s Parliament), Cromwell reported that the Rump had planned to use 
‘qualifications’, that is, to take steps to prevent the disaffected voting. But the Army had 
                                                          
1 C.V.Wedgwood, The Trial of Charles I (Collins, 1964), pp. 154-5.  All books published in London unless 
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feared that such measures would be inadequate: the officers ‘desired to know whether the 
next parliament were not like to consist of all presbyters, whether the qualifications would 
hinder them or neuters?’ In Cromwell’s view, this justified exclusion of those ‘brethren’ – a 
term that unmistakably meant fellow-puritans – who might be tempted to abuse their power: 
 
it is one thing to live friendly and brotherly, to bear with a love a person of another judgment in religion; 
another thing to have any set so far into the saddle upon that account as that it should be in them to have all the 
rest of their brethren at mercy.3 
   
His anxiety was not that the election would be fixed, but that the likely consequence even 
of a poll successfully excluding cavaliers would be ‘bringing in of Neuters, or such as should 
impose upon their brethren, or such as had given testimony to the King’s party’.4 The two 
elected parliaments of his Protectorate confirmed that his anxiety was wholly rational. A 
radical critic who quoted his speech complained that ‘notwithstanding these fine pretences, 
the greatest part of your Protectors first Parliament (so called) were Presbyters, Neuters or 
worse; and the second are as bad and worse than the former’.5 Nor did the subsequent 
experience of something that approached an unrestricted toleration significantly lessen its 
unpopularity. As Henry Stubbe remarked as late as 1659, ‘such is the posture of this nation at 
present, that if they be universally enstated in a perfect Liberty, they will invade Liberty of 
Conscience’. He added that ‘they who are for a free Toleration are the lesse numerous, 
beyond all proportion’.6 
It might have been expected, then, that those who favoured liberty of conscience would 
have been drawn to one of two solutions. One way of addressing the problem was to sever the 
state from ‘the people’ in order to attach it to the coming reign of Christ. Fifth Monarchists 
objected to English parliaments precisely because parliaments resulted from elections: ‘the 
greate objection which they made againste this Goverment [the Protectorate] was because it 
had a Parliament in it, whereby power is derived from the people, whereas all power belongs 
to Christ’.7 But this repudiation of parliamentary forms was hardly likely to win over 
moderate opinion.   A more traditional  response, adopted by John Milton, was to appropriate 
the term ‘the people’, but to identify that body with its ‘sounder part’. When his literary target 
                                                          
3 The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, ed. Wilbur Cortez Abbott, 4 vols (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1945), vol. III, p. 59. 
4 Ibid., III, p. 59. 
5 A looking-glasse for, or an awakening word to the superiour, and inferiour officers (1658), p. 58. 
6 Henry Stubbe, An essay in defence of the good old cause (London, 1659), ‘Preface’ [sig.**4+4r.-v]. 





Salmasius sarcastically enquired if it had been ‘the people’ (populus) who had purged the 
House of Commons, Milton responded 
 
I say populus.  Why should I not say that the populus did what the more capable, that is, the sounder part of 
the senate did, in whom the true power of the populus was located.  What if the majority of the senate should 
prefer to be slaves, what if they should prefer to sell the republic, should it not be permissible for the minority to 
stop it and preserve liberty if they can?8 
 
Here Milton was appealing to an older way of thinking. One way of thinking of a populus 
was as what might be termed a moralised community: a group that became something more 
than a mere ‘multitude’ (the usual word, as we shall see, for a mere aggregation) because it 
was shaped by appropriate moral commitments. For Milton, the concept of popular rule was 
anti-democratic because the phrase ‘the people’ implied the virtuous, a group that he assumed 
to be comparatively exclusive; he emphasised that he endorsed Salmasius’s opinion of ‘the 
lowest of the plebs’.9 In the last weeks of the Commonwealth, he was still fantasising about a 
self-perpetuating aristocracy ‘wherin they who are greatest, are perpetual servants and 
drudges to the public at thir own cost and charges’.10 
The weakness that was shared by such oligarchic schemes was that the characteristics that 
picked out the oligarchs had little if any connection with existing social structures. In the real 
political world, there was no solution to this problem: the more the regime reflected the 
balance of cultural power, the more likely it was to institute religious persecution. In the 
realm of ideas, however, there were developments that had the effect of rendering both liberty 
of conscience and democratic rule more thinkable. The distinction between a ‘people’ and a 
mere ‘multitude’ was not abandoned, but acquired a subtly different basis. The people was 
now conceived of a group of interest-holders; political action, if licit, consisted in the 
rationally self-interested defence of a regime protecting individual liberties. Though elements 
of this line of thought are implicit in Leveller writings, it found its fullest expression in 
pamphlets written in the 1650s by writers who appealed to classical ideas. A particularly 
striking characteristic of these writers – John Streater, Marchamont Nedham, James 
Harrington, and Henry Stubbe – was their explicit endorsement of the term ‘democracy’. 
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When their underlying assumptions are correctly understood, the rise of toleration and of 
popular government turn out to form a part of the same story. 
 
I 
The purpose of this chapter, then, is to address two questions. The first has to do with the 
history of the concept of ‘the people’. The second has to do with the apparent paradox that 
thinkers who were happy to be called ‘democrats’ were actually members of a small minority 
with much to lose from genuine majority involvement. My argument diagnoses a 
discontinuity between an older classical conception of ‘the people’, in which the term itself 
implied a virtuous multitude, and a more modern conception in which the idea of virtue 
played no necessary part. It would, to be sure, be absurd to suggest that the ubiquitous notion 
of the ‘freeborn Englishman’ had no association with virtuous qualities; it proved, however, 
possible to mount an argument for giving ‘the people’ ultimate political control solely in their 
capacity as rational interest-holders. As we shall see, it was of some importance that both the 
communal values involved in the earlier conception and the interest-protecting procedures 
required by the latter could be described, in English, by the same term: ‘the laws’. 
Like most of the other materials that these thinkers had to work with, the notion of a rule 
‘of laws’ could be found in Aristotle, whose categorisation of constitutional forms remained, 
throughout the period, the most important source in which ‘democracy’ came into focus.  
Aristotle had identified three different types of rule (by One, or by the Few, or by the Many). 
Each of these constitutions could be either good or bad, depending on whether the rulers 
pursued the public good or their own private interests. Within this familiar sixfold 
classification, the bad form of a single person’s rule was Tyranny; the good form, Monarchy.  
The bad form of rule by the Few was Oligarchy; the good form – the rule of the virtuous – 
was Aristocracy. ‘Democracy’ was the term reserved for the bad form of rule by the Many.11   
It will be noted that this classification, according to which ‘democracy’ refers to a bad 
thing, implies a definite preference for government by the Few. The Greek word dêmos 
literally means ‘village’; in other words, it seems to connote a cross-class whole. The 
Athenian assembly of the dêmos was in any case a gathering of the whole population. To the 
enemies of Athenian democracy, however, the dêmos referred to the Many, if not to the mob: 
a class that mismanaged the city for what it perceived (often wrongly) as its own benefit. For 
                                                          
11 Aristotle, Politics, ed. and transl. Harris Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Loeb 





the most part, Aristotle plainly shared this attitude.  It was a basic principle of his political 
thought that the distinctive purpose of the Greek city-state was ‘living well’, that is, a life of 
virtue.12 Living well required a moulding of personality through habits ordained or 
encouraged by means of appropriate ‘laws’. Law was ‘reason without desire’; it was the 
necessary corrective of the distorting influence of the passions.13 The characteristic attraction 
of democracy was ‘freedom’,14 but the underlying assumption of his anthropology was that 
freedom without this corrective was undesirable. The version of rule by the Many that was 
unconstrained by laws gave opportunities to demagogues and in the end amounted to 
collective tyranny.15 The best form in practice achievable in many situations was the 
compromise solution that he called politeia, a kind of order balancing the claims of wealth 
and freedom.16 This kind of constitution had an obvious rationale: as rule by the Few was 
unstable, it was natural and prudent to buy stability by allotting to the Many some share of 
political power.17 A well-known passage stated that this was best achieved where those of 
middling fortunes had a preponderance.18 
Aristotle also mentioned two further arguments whose implications were pro-democratic.  
In an admittedly tentative discussion, he noted that it is harder to corrupt a numerous 
assembly and also that the dêmos, considered as a whole, might have an expertise unmatched 
by any of its parts.19 These tentative suggestions remained available. It is striking, for 
example, that John Case’s treatise Sphaera Civitatis (1588) – an academic commentary on 
The Politics – was relatively favourable to popular involvement. Case carefully distinguished 
‘two types of multitude, one civilised, civic-minded, and disposed to practical wisdom; the 
other rude, slavish, and impelled to evil: the former moved by intellect more than by appetite; 
the latter more by the senses than by mind’.20 He agreed with Aristotle that the former had a 
role in some varieties of decision-making: ‘mixed with better men they can much benefit the 
city (no less than subtle food mixed in with something coarse can benefit health)’.21 Though 
Case was sure that sovereignty should be possessed by monarchs, he saw an ancillary 
                                                          
12 Ibid., 3.4.3, 3.5.13. 
13 Ibid., 3.11.4. 
14 Ibid., 4.4.2; 4.6.4. 
15 Ibid., 4.4.3-7. 
16 Ibid., 4.6.4-5. 
17 Ibid., 3.6.6, 5.6.4. 
18 Ibid., 4.9.8-10. 
19 Ibid., 3.10.5-6. 
20 John Case, Sphaera civitatis (Oxford, 1588), p. 253. 





function for such a multitude in what he referred to as media administratio, including 
‘counsels, judgements and elections’.22 
Case’s example shows that a moral multitude could have a secure but subordinate role in a 
mainstream political theory that set out to make sense of Aristotle. In general, however, the 
Athenian experiment with democratic rule did very little to encourage democratic thinking.  
The Roman model was more influential. It could hardly be disputed that the ‘Senate and 
People of Rome’ had been an extremely successful compound actor and that the Roman 
populus had formed an ordered whole that exercised political power by voting. Moreover, 
every tolerably educated person knew that the very concept of the Roman populus was bound 
up with commitment to a cluster of shared values. In perhaps the best-known passage of 
Augustine’s City of God, Augustine chose to criticise the Ciceronian view of the Latin word 
(or phrase) respublica: a term that was translated into early modern English by the English 
word (or phrase) a ‘commonweal’. On Cicero’s definition, a genuine respublica was a res 
populi – the idea of the ‘public’ presupposed the existence of a ‘people’ – and a populus was 
‘the assemblage (coetus) of a multitude associated by agreement on right (iuris consensu) and 
commonality of interest’.23 Augustine went on to remark that if this standard was applied, the 
Roman state had never been a respublica.  Within a pagan culture that knew nothing about 
ius (that is, about the absolute justice of the Christian God), there could be no true populus 
because there could be no consensus iuris. In consequence, he argued for another definition. 
The weaker sense of populus he chose to substitute referred to ‘the assemblage of a multitude 
not of beasts but of rational creatures associated by an agreed commonality of things (rerum) 
which it loves’ (in other words, earthly peace and earthly glory).24 
This latter definition was an important move, detaching the legitimacy of human polities 
from claims they were founded on some kind of absolute right. But English thinkers 
generally focused on the former; given their patriotic pride in England’s legal system, they 
saw no reason to deny that the English common weal was founded in a true consensus iuris. 
Their main objection to the Ciceronian definition was to the disturbing idea that such a 
populus was kingless. As early as 1470, Sir John Fortescue remarked that ‘St Austen... saith 
that a People is a multitude of men associated by the consent of lawe and communion of 
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wealthe.  And yett such a people beynge headless...is not worthye to be called a bodie’.25 A 
people without a head was thus defective, so much so that ‘a people that wyll raise themselfs 
into a kingdome, or into any other bodie politique must ever appointe one to be chiefe rueler 
of the whole bodie’.26 But a people of this sort was still to some extent united even before it 
acted to erect a monarchy: ‘the lawe under which a multitude of men is made a people, 
representeth the semblance of synews in ye body natural’.27 An important implication was 
that ‘as the head of a bodi natural cannot chaunge his sinewes…no more can a king which is 
ye head of a bodie politik chaunge the laws of ye bodie’.28 The social consequences were 
momentous. Unlike their counterparts in France, who lacked security of property, and were, it 
followed, poverty-stricken and demoralised, the beef-eating, beer-drinking yeomanry of 
England were both industrious and valiant.29 The constitutional doctrine was inextricably 
fused with patriotic social theory. 
It is, however, worth noting that this vision of the people, if anything, cemented the role of 
monarchy. For Fortescue and most of his successors, the inescapable image of the body 
politic implied that acephalous order was inconceivable. Sir Thomas Elyot’s treatise The boke 
named The Governour (1531) defined a ‘public weal’ as ‘a body lyvyng, compacte or made 
of sondry astates and degrees of men, whiche is disposed by the ordre of equite, and governed 
by the rule and moderation of reason’30 and explained that the word ‘publike toke his 
begynnyng of people, whiche in latin is Populus; in whiche worde is conteyned all the 
inhabitantes of a realme or citie, of what estate or condition soever they be’.31 In Elyot’s 
view, ‘Aristocratia’ was open to corruption, while ‘Democratia’ would lead to tyranny or 
licence.32 He took it for granted, moreover, that ‘one soveraigne governour’ was ordinarily.33 
The English Reformation on balance reinforced the logic of this monarch-focused 
thinking. The famous opening sentence of Henry VIII’s Act of Appeals (1533) echoed Elyot 
by speaking of ‘an empire...governed by one supreme head and king...unto whom a body 
politic, compact of all sorts and degrees of people...be bounden to owe and bear next to God a 
                                                          
25 I quote Mulcaster’s Elizabethan translation: Sir John Fortescue, A learned commendation of the politique 
laws of England, transl. Richard Mulcaster (1567), fo. 30. 
26 Ibid., fo.30v. 
27 Ibid., fo.31r. 
28 Ibid., fo.31v. 
29 Ibid., fos.79-86. 
30 Sir Thomas Elyot, The boke named the Governour (1530), fo.1. 
31 Ibid., fo.1v. 
32 Ibid., fo.1v 
32 Ibid., fo.6v-7r.                           





natural and humble obedience’.34 On this royalist conception of the English polity, the 
unifying crown rules a variety of ‘people’ (there seems to be no question of a definite article). 
But on the crown’s own reading of what was happening, the Reformation was brought in by 
the head-as-attached-to-the-body: in other words, by the king-in-parliament. It was natural for 
Sir Thomas Smith’s De republica Anglorum (written 1565) to account for this by reference to 
a Roman analogue: ‘all that ever the people of Rome might do either in Centuriatis comitiis 
or tributis, the same may be doone by the parliament of Englande, which representeth and 
hath the power of the whole realme, both the head and the bodie’.35 
Smith’s statement is rightly much-quoted. It documents the presence, in a celebrated text, 
of a classical understanding of ‘the people’, in which parliament (including the ‘head’, that is, 
the monarch) effectively maps onto a republican assembly. Though Smith loyally insisted 
‘that I cannot understand that our nation hath used any other and generall authoritie in this 
realme neither Aristocraticall nor Democraticall, but onely the royall and kingly majestie’,36 
his detailed account of the nature of English government was startlingly hospitable to popular 
involvement. The sixfold classification of forms of government could offer helpful 
intellectual guidance, ‘yet you must not take that ye shall finde any common wealth or 
governement simple, pure and absolute in his sort and kinde’.37 The most striking single 
feature of his analysis was his surprising friendliness to popular involvement. Even in modern 
monarchies, legitimate government required the ‘good will of the people’ at the moment of 
accession.38 Moreover, ‘changes of fashions of governement of common wealthes be naturall, 
and do not alwayes come of ambition or malice’.39 For example, ‘the source and naturall 
beginning of the rule of the multitude which the Greeks call Democratia’ was the wish of the 
Many ‘to save the politicke bodie, to conserve the authoritie of their nation, to defende 
themselves against all other, their strife being onely for empire and rule, and who should doe 
best for the common wealth, whereof they would have experience made by bearing office and 
being magistrates’.40 In English circumstances, Smith singled out freeholding yeomen – 
‘which olde Cato calleth Aratores and optimos cives in Republica’ – as the lowest class who 
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36 Ibid., p. 56. 
37 Ibid., p. 52. 
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regularly bore office, but noted that even the landless – England’s proletarii – were 
‘commonly’ made churchwardens and ‘manie times’ constables.41 
The best-known Tudor book about the nation’s government thus went to some lengths to 
imagine the inhabitants of England in terms derived from classical writings about politics. It 
cannot be concluded that Smith was providing a record of a lived reality; the literary exercise 
that he was undertaking required that he discover the Roman civic virtues in England’s forty-
shilling freeholders. It is nonetheless important, for present purposes, that the availability of 
classical ideas about the nature of an ordered ‘people’ encouraged a positive vision of 
‘democracy’ itself. The nature and the limitations of this kind of thinking might seem to point 
to an ideal of mixed government in which the political virtues imputed to the people (deriving 
from a Fortescue’s picture of the English yeomanry provided a possible basis for the kind of 
agency that is the focus of the present essay.42 It is, however, fundamental to my argument 
that this was actually the path not taken.  In the political crisis of 1642, ideals of mixed 
government were of course available, but they were actually most prominent in the moderate 
royalist Answer to the Nineteen Propositions (1642). It was Charles, not his opponents, who 
insisted that ‘the good of Democracy is Liberty, and the Courage and Industry which Liberty 
begets’.43 As we shall see, the source of the democratising impulse lay in an altogether 
different pattern of ideas. 
 
II 
When parliament gathered its Army in 1642 in order to resist the king’s foreseeable 
aggression, it carefully avoided claiming the power to make law. Its chosen legal instrument, 
the Militia Ordinance, was not, strictly speaking, a statute but a somewhat irregular measure 
that Commons and Lords together had judged appropriate. This feature of its position has 
often been ignored; historians have on the whole agreed with royalists that claims to an 
unfettered adjudicative power amounted to a grab for legislative sovereignty. But 
parliament’s way of framing its constitutional claims had a decisive influence on subsequent 
debate. In permitting the Houses to claim that they were acting as a court, it allowed them to 
pose as defenders of royal authority impersonally realised within the legal system. As the 
parliamentarian Charles Herle explained 
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the faculty of Legem dare is not in difference, the question is about the Declarative, that of legem dicere, the 
Law is the rule, and cannot be framed without all the three Estates, but who must apply this rule by giving it the 




In Law, He judges not but by his Courts, in the meanest of which the sentence past stands good in Law, 
though the King by Proclamation or in Person should oppose it.45 
 
Thus the Houses’ official position was that they were taking licit if extraordinary steps to 
defend the impersonal structures of Crown authority; conversely, the royalist army was a 
gang of criminals. Under the circumstances of the crisis, the king had been absorbed within a 
legal apparatus. Unlike the theory of mixed monarchy (which of its nature valued the 
monarch’s agency as a component of an ideal mixture), this was a view of kingship that 
minimised the role of Charles’s personal opinions; indeed, it paved the way towards the 
radical conclusion that strictly personal monarchy was needless. In the event, the legislation 
that abolished kingship – An Act for the abolishing the Kingly Office (March 1649) – treated 
its personal aspect as at best superfluous: ‘the office of a king in this nation and to have the 
same in any single person’ was ‘unnecessary, burthensome, and dangerous to the liberty, 
safety, and public interest of the people’.46 
There was, however, a weakness in this plausible position. The concept of representation 
to which the two Houses appealed was actually novel in its basic character. As we have seen, 
conceptions of the role of parliament encouraged by the notion of the body politic laid stress 
on the way it united the whole community: the king surrounded by the communitas regni was 
capable of doing things that the king alone could not. But the whole represented the whole. In 
the words by Smith we have already quoted, ‘all that ever the people of Rome might do either 
in Centuriatis comitiis or tributis, the same may be doone by the parliament of Englande, 
which representeth and hath the power of the whole realme, both the head and the bodie.  For 
everie Englishman is entended to bee there present’.47 Commons and Lords together were the 
representative body (as opposed to the head) of the kingdom: the simultaneous presence of 
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the whole community. The notion of ‘representation’ (that is, a ‘making present’) was a 
description, not an explanation, of the fact that the men who were present bound the absent. 
There was no need to speculate about the particular balance of interests involved or about the 
particular channels through which consent was passed.   
Given the situation of Tudor Protestants, this emphasis was very much what might have 
been expected. The Protestants were initially a small minority that wanted to use parliament 
to mobilise the nation. Their focus was thus on the power of the representative to act in ways 
that bound the represented. But in the 1640s almost nobody presumed that the ability of 
representers to act so as to bind the represented could simply be taken for granted to the 
latter’s detriment. ‘Representation’ had become a problem, if only because royalists were 
anxious to cast doubt on parliament’s capacity to represent the people. As Henry Parker put 
it, ‘the vertue of representation hath beene denied to the Commons, and a severance has 
beene made betwixt the parties chosen and the parties choosing’.48 The intelligent royalist 
Dudley Digges responded that ‘the sense of it is, a trust is committed to [the Commons], and 
they are to be guided according to Conscience in the performance of it. Let it be so: but is not 
this clearely the Kings case, who is entrusted certainly as highly as they?’49 What was 
needed, it seemed, was an argument predicting that parliament’s behaviour would be better 
than the king’s. 
That argument was discovered in talk of ‘interests’. Charles Herle maintained that 
 
experience shews that most mens actions are swayed (most what) by their ends and interests; those of Kings 
(for the most part) as absoluteness of rule, enlargement of Revenue by Monopolies, Patents etc are altogether 
incompatible and crosse centred to those of Subjects, as Property, Priviledge etc, with which the Parliament’s 
either ends or interests cannot thus dash and interfere, the Members being all Subjects themselves, not only 
intrusted with, but selfe interested in those very Priviledges and Properties; besides, they are many, and so they 
not onely see more, but are lesse swayable.50 
 
Just the same logic is observable in Henry Parker’s fascinating tract Ius Populi (1644). The 
main thrust of his argument that parliament (without the king) quite simply was the people: it 
was ‘indeed nothing else, but the very people itself artificially congregated or reduced by an 
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orderly election, and representation into such a Senate, or proportionable body’.51 In other 
moods, however, he tacitly admitted that this was an over-statement. The argument that he 
presented for treating the two Houses as ‘the supreme reason or Judicature’ of the nation was 
that they could have ‘no interests different from the people represented, or at least very few, 
and those not considerable’.52   
It was, in other words, as interest-holders that individuals were represented. When Ireton 
at Putney excluded the poor from elections, he naturally focused on their lack of interests: 
 
This, I perceive, is pressed as that which is so essential and due: the right of the people of this kingdom, and 
as they are the people of this kingdom, distinct and divided from other people, and that we must for this right lay 
aside all other considerations...For my part, I think it is no right at all.  I think that no person hath a right to an 
interest or share in the disposing of the affairs of the kingdom, and in determining  or choosing those that shall 
determine what laws we shall be ruled by here – no person hath a right to this, that hath not a permanent fixed 
interest in this kingdom, and those persons together are properly the represented of this kingdom, and 
consequently are to make up the representers of this kingdom, who taken together do comprehend whatsoever is 
of real or permanent interest in the kingdom.53   
 
What is most striking about this is the rapidity with which talk about ‘interests’ had been 
assimilated. Part of the explanation must lie in political writings with which the educated 
were quite familiar. Before the outbreak of the civil wars, the main political use of the idea of 
‘interest’ was to supply analysis of foreign policy, as in the duc de Rohan’s famous maxim 
that ‘Princes command the people and interest [singular: l’interêt] commands princes’.54 An 
interest-based analysis could serve a range of causes; in Marchamont Nedham’s early work 
The case of the kingdom stated according to the interests of the severall parties ingaged 
(1647), ‘interest’ was the foundation of a case for royalism. There were, however, good 
reasons for the place of interests in proto-democratic speculation: the attraction of the concept 
was that interests predict.   
As we have seen, the occasion of the military conflict had less to do with power to create 
new institutions than with interpretation of the existing ones. It was widely assumed that the 
basic political problem was to locate the agent that possessed the right incentives to act as the 
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defender of English liberties. The royalist solution was expressed by Dudley Digges, who 
thought it  
 
against common sense to fancy, that he which enjoyes all by the benefit of Lawes, should hinder the due 
administration of justice according to those Lawes, and so wilfully endanger not onely his rights, but safety, by 
putting his Kingdome into tumuls and combustion.55 
 
The Rump’s official justification of its own position – A declaration of the parliament of 
England, expressing the grounds of their late proceedings, and of setling the present 
government in the way of a free state (1649) – made use of the language of interests to make 
very similar claims: 
 
They know their own Authority to be by the Law, to which the people have assented; and besides their 
particular interests (which are not inconsiderable), they more intend the Common Interest of those whom they 
serve, and clearly understand the same not possible to be preserved without the Laws and Government of the 
Nation; and that if those should be taken away, all industry must cease, all misery, blood and confusion would 
follow, and greater calamities, if possible, than fell upon us by the late King’s misgovernment, would certainly 
involve all persons, under which they must inevitably perish.56 
 
Both views were plainly vulnerable to the same objection: if rational self-interest predicts 
behaviour, then any government will have a clear propensity to put its private interest before 
that of the public.  Only the people as a whole has no such interest. 
 Thus John Streater’s A glympse of that jewel, judicial, just preserving libertie (1653) 
maintained that ‘seeing in Government that every Persons interest and good in that bodie is 
concerned, ’tis clear that the power is essentially in the people..’.57 The people, moreover, 
‘have no other end in what they desire, but common equity; whereas otherwise great persons 
are swayed by several ends and interests’.58 Streater was not by any means indifferent to 
virtue – his pamphlet is essentially a call to vigilance – but he expected virtue to derive from 
understanding of the advantages of liberty: ‘everyone is to understand that he is equally 
interessed with any member in repect of the common Libertie’.59 The defence of law was 
crucial, but the object of the law was to preserve the status of individuals: ‘all Law and 
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Government originally ariseth from the Law of Nature, to preserve all in being and 
propertie’.60 The solution that Streater favoured was thus a succession of frequent but 
shortlived parliaments allowing the represented to exercise control over the doings of their 
representers. 
 
To prevent the having the Power wrested out of the hands of the People by an assumed absoluteness of 
persons in trust; suffer not great power to continue longer then one year in the hands of any one member of the 
Commonwealth.  Doubtless, it was upon the same reason of state that that Act of Parliament was passed...that 
Parliaments should be chosen once a year, or oftner, if need be.61 
 
At this stage, he avoided the term ‘democracy’, but he assimilated the English attitude 
expressed in legislation for annual parliaments to democratic elements of classical republics. 
As publisher of James Harrington’s Oceana (1656), he could claim to be the midwife to the 
greatest synthesis of interest-talk with classical republican arrangements. If he was the J. S. 
who wrote What monarchie, aristocracie, oligarchie, and democracie is (1659), he came to 
believe that ‘democracy’ was just a synonym of ‘Free-State, or Popular State, or Common-
wealth’.62 
 There was, in other words, a clear democratising logic inherent in the English politics 
of interests. The working through of the idea that monarchs are entrusted with private 
interests encouraged the search for an agent that was fully trustworthy. If interest was 
predictive, then the correct solution was to trust in the agent – ‘the people’ – with a collective 
interest in interests being preserved. These interests, moreover, consisted in individual rights 
of the sort that English law had long defended. In a revealing passage contesting Hobbes’s 
claim that ‘liberty’ had the same meaning under Turkish despotism as in the republican city-
state of Lucca, Harrington made it clear that political ‘liberty’ is ultimately reducible to 
private liberties: 
 
whereas the greatest [Turkish] bashaw is a tenant, as well of his head as of his estate, at the will of his lord, 
the meanest Lucchese that hath land is a freeholder of both, and not to be controlled but by the law; and that 
framed by every private man unto no other end (or they may thank themselves) than to protect the liberty of 
every private man, which by that means comes to be the liberty of the commonwealth.63 
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Oceana prescribes representative institutions ‘so constituted as can never contract any other 
interest than that of the whole people’;64 the preservation of such institutions was to rest on 
the assurance that private interests infallibly add up to the public interest.  
The same untroubled confidence that interests predict pervades the ideas of Nedham in his 
democratic phase. In Nedham’s view ‘the main Interest and Concernment both of Kings and 
Grandees’ lay in keeping the people ‘in utter ignorance what Liberty is’; by contrast, ‘in Free-
States the People…become immediately instructed that their main Interest and Concernment 
consists in Liberty; and are taught by common sense, that the onely way to secure it from 
Great Ones, is, to place it in the Peoples Hands’.65 The ‘magnanimous, active, and noble 
temper of Spirit’ for which the peoples of free states were noted arose from ‘that 
apprehension which every Man hath of his own immediate share in the publick Interest’.66 
Contrary to the assertions of the royalists and others, government by the people was ‘the 
onely preservative of Propriety’: the requirement of ‘common Consent’ had the foreseeable 
result that ‘every Man’s particular interest must needs be fairly provided for, against the 
Arbitrary disposition of others’.67 Moreover, talk of interests (understood as legal rights) 
evaded objections founded on the need for expertise; whatever else the people were incapable 
of judging, they could be assumed to have noticed if their rights were being infringed. As 
government was thought of as primarily a matter of redressing grievances, the people 
themselves were the experts on the art of government: they were ‘most sensible of their own 
burthens… and therefore it is but Reason, they should see that none be interested in the 
supreme Authority, but Persons of their own election, and such as must in a short time return 
again into the same condition with themselves’.68 
It is true that Nedham, like Milton, insisted that ‘the people’ was not identical with the 
whole body of the population. The phrase did not mean ‘the confused promiscuous Body of 
the People, nor any part of the people who have forfeited their Rights by Delinquency, 
Neutrality, or Apostacy etc’.69 But the spirit of their theories was wholly different.  Milton’s 
‘people’ excluded the poorest.70 It would forever be the case that the lowest of the plebs 
should be excluded from political action. By contrast, Nedham’s restrictive definition of ‘the 
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people’ arose from a particular and local situation that would presumably be temporary; his 
interest-based argument not only allowed but required the maximum feasible element of 
popular involvement. 
Streater, Harrington, and Nedham can thus be used to illustrate a single line of thought.   
In each case, the assumption that interests predict was used to press towards the shared 
conclusion that the correct solution was ‘successive parliaments’ elected by a vote of the 
whole people. The same can be said of a final instructive example: Henry Stubbe’s 
tolerationist pamphlet An essay on the good old cause (1659). What makes Stubbe’s thought 
revealing, for present purposes, is that he took up, and then dropped, the word ‘democracy’, 
but stayed in essence loyal to the pattern of ideas that seems to have made democratic politics 
compelling. An essay on the good old cause (1659) is highly sympathetic to Harrington’s 
ideas, ‘yet as limited to the good people which have adhered to the Good old cause’.71 This 
seems to have been thought of as a temporary expedient; another possibility was to introduce 
‘some influencing Senate, who may so long continue as the necessity of the nation shall 
require’.72 In the long term, he thought that it was ‘as impossible for a Democracy to be 
partial, as for one upon a hundred Dice to cast as many [i.e.one hundred], or fifty-one aces’.73 
Only a few weeks later,74 though, his attitudes had hardened, apparently because he had 
thought through the implications of Sir George Booth’s Presbyterian rebellion. His next 
publication, A letter to an officer of the army concerning a select senate, put flesh on the idea 
of an ‘influencing senate’ by distinguishing ‘the people’, who were the small minority of 
tolerationists who had been active in resisting Booth, from the ‘nation’, that is, the general 
population.75 The ‘whole Nation’ was to be charged with electing parliament – admittedly 
‘upon due qualifications’ – but the ‘people’ would choose the senate, which would control 
the army, the ministry, and the universities (that is the institutions where the ministers were 
trained).76 Membership of the people was to be hereditary; ‘Papists, Prelatical and 
Presbyterial persons’ were to be forever excluded.77 In a startling about-turn, Stubbe now 
argued that the Spartan constitution was a convincing precedent for aristocracy, while ‘the 
popular constitution of Athens presents us with very little that might endear it unto us’.78   
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Stubbe’s change of heart nicely reveals that it was toleration that he really cared about: the 
conclusion that he drew from the Booth crisis was that ‘the quarrel was Toleration or no 
Toleration, rather then Monarchy and the Stuartian interest’.79 It is, however, striking that he 
did not give up the underlying logic of his interest-based thinking. He took it for granted that 
those who set up a government ‘may appoint Legislatours for themselves, but not for others 
directly’.80 The senate was to function as a supplementary safeguard, but ‘so much liberty is 
due to the such as oppose or are inconsistent with the rising Government, as may consist with 
the continuance thereof’.81 It was not ‘to intermeddle ordinarily either in the Executive or 
Legislative power of the nation’; its purpose was that ‘so they [i.e. ‘the people’] being 
secured, the other part of the Nation may enjoy that freedom which otherwise could not be 
permitted them with safety’.82 Though he dropped the word ‘democracy’, he did not abandon 
the thing.  In other words, he favoured as much democracy as was compatible with toleration. 
 
III 
Stubbe’s thinking is instructive because it clarifies the underlying structure of a cultural 
situation. In particular, it suggests a plausible answer to the perplexing problem that was 
raised at the start of this chapter: why did members of a small unpopular minority desire a 
political system that they themselves believed would be threatening to ‘liberty of 
conscience’? The essence of that answer lies in the possibility supplied by interest-talk of 
radical separation between secular forms of order and private individual religious practices. 
To presbyterians like Richard Baxter, it was obvious that order required discipline, and that 
religious discipline, provided by the church, was indissolubly a part of discipline in general; 
conversely, institutions that gave power to the people gave power to the enemies of 
Christianity.  A long list of the enemies that godliness confronted included 
 
the Democratical Polititians that are busie about the change of Government, and would bring all into 
confusion under pretence of the Peoples Liberty or Power, and would have the Major Part of the Subjects to be 
the Soveraign of the rest; that is, the worst, that are still the most; and the ignorant, that cannot Rule themselves, 
and the vicious, that are enemies and hinderers of piety...83 
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The anti-Presbyterians considered in this chapter had two convergent reasons to adopt a 
different view. First, the initial framing of civil war debate encouraged parliament’s soldiers 
to understand themselves as principled defenders of legal liberties. When the New Model 
Army leaders declared that ‘we are not a meer Mercenary Army, hired to serve an Arbitrary 
power of State’, they did so on the grounds that they had been ‘called forth, and conjured by 
the several Declarations of Parliament to the Defence of the People’s just Rights and 
Liberties’.84 Edward Sexby concurred that ‘if we had not a right to the kingdom, we were 
mere mercenary soldiers’.85 In other words, the Army’s claim to standing in the matter rested 
upon defence of constitutional liberties that were, as it happened, primarily secular in content. 
One useful implication of this sort of emphasis was that the Good Old Cause could be 
regarded as distinct from the project of installing a Presbyterian church. Thus when Oliver 
Cromwell dissolved his first Protectoral parliament, he complained of a ‘strange itch’ of some 
MPs to ‘put their finger upon their brethren’s consciences, to pinch them there’, supporting 
his position with the well-known remark that ‘to do this was no part of the contest we had 
with the common adversary, for religion was not the thing at the first contested for’.86 
Secondly, the view of religion that all these writers shared depicted it as something that 
was plainly too important to be entrusted to another agent. In Harrington’s view, ‘democracy, 
being nothing but entire liberty – and liberty of conscience without civil liberty, or civil 
liberty without liberty of conscience, being but liberty by halves – must admit of liberty of 
conscience’.87 Religion was a natural part of every human life; coercion intruded interest 
where it did not belong: ‘where religion is coercive, or in subjection to interest, there it is not, 
or will not long continue to be the true religion’.88 Nedham agreed that the effect of 
‘bind[ing] mens Consciences to retain Notions, ordained for Orthodox, upon civill penalties’ 
was to ‘twist the Spiritual Power (as they call it) with the Worldly and secular interest of 
state’.89 Lastly, Stubbe thought that ‘things Spiritual’ were ‘of a different nature, and not 
subordinate’.90 The ‘most obvious and universall end of nations in erecting government’ was 
‘the upholding society and entercourse by securing each in their property, and manage of 
commerce betwixt one another’.91 But things of a spiritual nature were entirely different: 
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‘men embody under Magistrates for upholding civill commerce, but they gather into 
Churches to maintain a spirituall communion’.92 Given disparities in spiritual gifts, it would 
be bafflingly irrational to ‘confer a power on their Magistrate to countenance, promote and 
uphold they know not what’.93 
In an enthusiastic private letter, an Oxford friend regretted that 
 
you continued not your history of toleration down to these times and gave us an account of Holland France 
Poland etc…when you have added the authority of daily experience that men of different professions may 
quietly unite (antiquity the testimony) under the same government and unanimously cary the same civill intrest 
and hand in hand march to the same end of peace and mutuall society though they take different way towards 
heaven, you will adde noe small strength to your cause...94 
 
The fact that this friend was the young John Locke is obviously suggestive: it seems to be a 
sign of a substantial overlap between the early history of democratic thought and the pre-
history of liberalism. It would be easy to conclude by drawing the connections: the secular 
sphere occupied by talk of interests was conducive both to arguments for popular 
involvement and also to a politics that saw defence of rights as the sole licit reason for 
coercion. The more intense the focus on private interests, the more the magistrate’s duty of 
promoting godliness could be excluded from the moral picture. There is, however, another, 
perhaps less obvious, way in which these lines of thought can be connected. If, as has been 
suggested, these writers were inclined to think of ‘liberty of conscience’ as something too 
important to entrust to someone else, it followed that the interest-talk of normal politics was 
something relatively unimportant. As Stubbe perceived, the unregenerate ‘nation’ could be 
entrusted with political power only when the true liberty he really cared about had been 
secured by rather different methods; the prize that really mattered had been taken off the 
table. In other words, democracy became acceptable precisely because the sanctity of liberty 
of conscience prevented it from being fully sovereign.  
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